A first order theory T is tight iff for any deductively closed extensions U and V of T (both of which are formulated in the language of T ), U and V are bi-interpretable iff U = V. By a theorem of Visser, PA (Peano Arithmetic) is tight. Here we show that Z 2 (second order arithmetic), ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory), and KM (Kelley-Morse theory of classes) are also tight theories.
Introduction
The source of inspiration for this paper is located in a key result of Albert Visser [V, Corollaries 9.4 & 9.6 ] concerning a curious interpretabilitytheoretic feature of PA (Peano arithmetic), namely:
1.1. Theorem. (Visser) Suppose U and V are deductively closed extensions of PA (both of which are formulated in the language of PA). Then U is a retract of V if V ⊆ U. In particular, U and V are bi-interpretable iff U = V.
A natural reaction to Theorem 1.1 is to ask whether the exhibited interpretability-theoretic feature of PA is shared by other theories. As shown here, the answer to this question is positive 1 , in particular:
In the remainder of this section we review some basic notions and results of interpretability theory in order to clarify and contextualize Theorems 1.1 & 1.2.
1.3. Definitions. Suppose U and V are first order theories, and for the sake of notational simplicity, let us assume that U and V are theories that support a definable pairing function and are formulated in relational languages. We use L U and L V to respectively designate the languages of U and V .
(a) An interpretation I of U in V , written:
is given by a translation τ of each L U -formula ϕ into an L V -formula ϕ τ with the requirement that V ⊢ ϕ τ for each ϕ ∈ U , where τ is determined by an L V -formula δ(x) (referred to as a domain formula), and a mapping P → τ A P that translates each n-ary L U -predicate P into some n-ary L Vformula A P . The translation is then lifted to the full first order language in the obvious way by making it commute with propositional connectives, and subject to:
(∀xϕ) τ = ∀x(δ(x) → ϕ τ ) and (∃xϕ) τ = ∃x(δ(x) ∧ ϕ τ ).
Note that each interpretation I : U → V gives rise to an inner model construction that uniformly builds a model M I |= U for any M |= V .
(b) U is interpretable in V , written U V , iff there is an interpretation I : U → V. U and V are mutually interpretable when U V and V U.
(c) We indicate the universe of each structure with the corresponding Roman letter, e.g., the universes of structures M, N , and M * are respectively M , N , and M * . Given an L-structure M and X ⊆ M n (where n is a positive integer), we say that X is M-definable iff X is parametrically definable in M, i.e., iff there is an n-ary formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) in the language L M obtained by augmenting L with constant symbols m for each m ∈ M such that
We say that N is parametrically interpretable in M, written N par M (equivalently: M par N ) iff the universe of discourse of N , as well as all the N -interpretations of L U -predicates are M-definable. Note that par is a transitive relation.
(e) U is a retract of V iff there are interpretations I and J with I : U → V and J : V → U , and a binary U -formula F such that F is, U -verifiably, an isomorphism between id U (the identity interpretation on U ) and J • I. In model-theoretic terms, this translates to the requirement that the following holds for every M |= U :
(f ) U and V are bi-interpretable 3 iff there are interpretations I and J as above that witness that U is a retract of V , and additionally, there is a V -formula G, such that G is, V -verifiably, an isomorphism between id V and I • J . In particular, if U and V are bi-interpretable, then given M |= U and N |= V , we have
We conclude this section with salient examples. In what follows ACA 0 (arithmetical comprehension with limited induction) and GB (Gödel-Bernays theory of classes) are the well-known subsystems of Z 2 and KM (respectively) satisfying: ACA 0 is a conservative extension of PA, and GB is a conservative extension of ZF.
1.4. Theorem. (Folklore) PA ACA 0 and ZF GB; but ACA 0 PA and GB ZF.
Proof Outline. The first two statements have routine proofs; the last two follow by combining (a) the finite axiomatizability of ACA 0 and GB, (b) the reflexivity of PA and ZF (i.e., they prove the consistency of each finite fragment of themselves), and (c) Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
By classical results of Ackermann and Mycielski, the structures (V ω , ∈) and (N, +, ·) are bi-interpretable, where V ω is the set of hereditarily finite sets. The two interpretations at work can be used to show Theorem 1.5 below. In what follows, ZF fin is the theory obtained by replacing the axiom of infinity 3 The notion of bi-interpretability has been informally around for a long time, but according to Hodges [H] it was first studied in a general setting by Ahlbrandt and Ziegler [AZ] . A closely related concept (dubbed sometimes as synonymy, and other times as definitional equivalence) was introduced by de Bouvère [D] . Synonymy is a stronger form of bi-interpretation; however, by a result of Friedman and Visser [FV] , in many cases synonymy is implied by bi-interpretability, namely, when the two theories involved are sequential, and the bi-interpretability between them is witnessed by a pair of one-dimensional, identity preserving interpretations.
by its negation in the usual axiomatization of ZF and TC is the sentence asserting "every set has a transitive closure". 4 1.5. Theorem. (Ackermann [A] , Mycielski [My] , Kaye-Wong [KW] ) PA and ZF fin + TC are bi-interpretable.
1.6. Theorem. (E-Schmerl-Visser [ESV, Theorem 5 .1]) ZF fin and PA are not bi-interpretable; indeed ZF fin is not even a sentential retract 5 of ZF fin + TC.
Solid Theories
The notions of solidity, neatness, and tightness encapsulated in Definition 2.1 below are only implicitly introduced in Visser's paper [V] . It is not hard to see that a solid theory is neat, and a neat theory is tight. Hence to establish Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 it suffices to verify the solidity of PA, Z 2 , ZF, and KM. This is precisely what we will accomplish in this section. The proof of Theorem 1.1 is presented partly as an exposition of Visser's original proof which is rather indirect since it is couched in terms of series of technical general lemmata, and partly because it provides a warm-up for the proof of Theorem 2.5 which establishes the solidity of Z 2 . The proof of Theorem 2.6 establishing the solidity of ZF, on the other hand, requires a brand new line of argument. The proof of Theorem 2.7, which establishes the solidity of KM is the most complex among the proofs presented here; it can be roughly described as using a blend of ideas from the proofs of Theorems 2.5 and 2.6. 2.1. Definition. Suppose T is a first order theory. (a) T is solid iff the following property ( * ) holds for all models M, M * , and N of T :
4 More explicitly; the axioms of ZF fin consists of the axioms of Extensionality, Empty Set, Pairs, Union, Power set, Foundation, and ¬Infinity, plus the scheme of Replacement. Note that ZF fin has also been used in the literature (e.g., by the Prague school) to denote the stronger theory in which the Foundation axiom is strengthened to the Foundation scheme; the latter theory is deductively identical to ZF fin + TC in our notation.
5 The notion of a sentential retract is the natural weakening of the notion of a retract in which the requirement of the existence of a definable isomorphism between M and M * is weakened to the requirement that M and M * be elementarily equivalent.
(b) T is neat iff for any two deductively closed extensions U and V of T (both of which are formulated in the language of T ), U is a retract of
(c) T is tight iff for any two deductively closed extensions U and V of T (both of which are formulated in the language of T ), U and V are bi-interpretable iff U = V.
2.1.1. Remark. A routine argument shows that if T and T ′ are bi-interpretable, and T is solid, then T ′ is also solid.
Proof. Suppose M, M * , and N are models of PA such that: We claim that both j 0 and j 1 are surjective. To see this, suppose not. Then j(M ) is a proper initial segment of M * , where j is the M-definable
) is a proper M-definable initial segment of M with no last element. This is a contradiction since M is a model of PA, and therefore no proper initial segment of M is M-definable. Hence j 0 and j 1 are both surjective; in particular j 0 serves as the desired M-definable isomorphism between M and N .
2.2.1. Corollary. ZF fin + TC is solid.
Proof. In light of Remark 2.1.1, this is an immediate consequence of coupling Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 1.5.
Before presenting the proof of solidity of Z 2 we need to state two propositions concerning theories that prove the full scheme of induction over some specified choice of 'numbers'. The proofs of Propositions is a straightforward adaptation of the well-known proof for the special case of PA, so it is only presented in outline form.
2.3. Proposition. Let T be a theory formulated in a language L such that T interprets Q via an interpretation whose domain formula for 'numbers' is N(x). Furthermore assume the following two hypotheses:
where Ind N (L) is the scheme of induction over N whose instances are universal closures of L-formulae of the form below :
where x + is shorthand for the successor of x, and θ is allowed to have suppressed parameters; these parameters are not required to lie in N.
Then there is a K-definable initial embedding j :
, the following definition by recursion produces the desired j.
2.4. Proposition. Suppose K is an L-structure that interprets a model of Q via an interpretation whose domain formula for 'numbers' is N(x) and Ind N (L) holds in K. Then every K-definable proper initial segment of N K has a last element.
Proof. Easy: the veracity of Ind N (L) in K immediately implies that any K-definable initial segment of N K with no last element coincides with N K .
2.5. Theorem. Z 2 is solid.
Proof. Following standard practice (as in [S] ) models of Z 2 are represented as two-sorted structures of the form (M, A), where M |= PA, A is a collection of subsets of M , and (M, A) satisfies the full comprehension scheme. Suppose (M, A), (M * , A * ), and (N , B) are models of Z 2 such that:
and there is an (M, A)-definable isomorphism
Note that i 0 is naturally induced by i 0 , where: (1 + ) There is an (M, A)-definable isomorphism k 0 : N → M, and
be the natural extension of k 0 , i.e., k 0 (n) := k 0 (n) for n ∈ N , and k 0 (B) = {k 0 (n) : n ∈ B} for B ∈ B. Note that the (M, A)-definability of k 0 , along with the veracity of the comprehension scheme in (M, A) assures us that k 0 (B) ∈ A for each B ∈ B. Therefore k 0 is an embedding. Using an identical reasoning, since (M * , A * ) is (N , B) -definable by assumption, we can extend k 1 to an embedding
The proof of Theorem 2.5 will be complete once we verify that k 0 is surjective. Since we already know that k 0 is surjective, it suffices to check that
Observe that the restriction k : M → M of i to 'numbers' is an automorphism of M, thanks to (1 + ), (2 + ), and the assumption that i 0 is an isomorphism. But since k is (M, A)-definable i(m) = m for all m ∈ M , thanks to the veracity of Ind N (L) in (M, A), for L = L Z 2 , which in turn implies that k is just the identity automorphism on (M, A). Hence k 0 and k 1 are both surjective.
In the following corollary, ZF is the result of substituting the Replacement scheme in the usual axiomatization of ZF (e.g., as in [K] ) with the scheme of Collection, whose instances consist of universal generalizations of formulae of the form (∀x ∈ a ∃y ϕ(x, y)) → (∃b ∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b ϕ(x, y)), where the parameters of ϕ are suppressed.
2.5.1. Corollary. The following theory T is solid:
Proof. In light of Remark 2.1.1, this is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.5 and the well-known bi-interpretability of T with Z 2 + Π 1 ∞ -AC, where Π 1 ∞ -AC is the scheme of choice. 7 2.6. Theorem. ZF is solid.
Proof. Suppose M, M * , and N are models of ZF such that:
and there is an M-definable isomorphism i 0 : M → M * . Since M injects M into M * via i 0 , and M * ⊆ N , we have:
(1) N is a proper class as viewed from M.
Let E := ∈ M * . E is both extensional and well-founded as viewed from N ; extensionality trivially follows from the assumption that M * |= ZF, and wellfoundedness can be easily verified using the assumptions that M par N and i 0 is an M-definable isomorphism between M and M * . We wish to show that E := ∈ M * is set-like 8 as viewed from N , i.e., for every c ∈ M * , c E is a set (as opposed to a proper class) of N , where c E := {x ∈ M * : xEc}. This will take some effort to establish. We will present the argument in full detail, especially because a natural adaptation of the same argument will also work in one of the stages of the proof of Theorem 2.7 (establishing the solidity of KM), and will therefore be left to the reader. We will first show that E is set-like when restricted to Ord M * . 9 To this end, let δ ∈ Ord M * , δ E := {m ∈ M * : mEδ}, and consider the N -definable ordered structure ∆ :
7 This bi-interpretability was first explicitly noted by Mostowski in the context of the so-called β-models of Z2 + Π 1 ∞ -AC (which correspond to well-founded models of T ). See [S, Theorem VII.3 .34] for a refined version of this bi-interpretability result.
8 In the context of ZF, the extension of a binary formula R(x, y) is set-like iff for every set s there is a set t such that t = {x : R(x, s)}.
9 Note that if the axiom of choice holds in M * , then by Zermelo's well-ordering theorem, from the point of view of N the set-likeness of E when restricted to Ord M * immediately implies the set-likeness of E.
It is clear, thanks to i 0 , that N views ∆ as a well-founded linear order in the strong sense that every nonempty N -definable subclass of δ E has an E-least member. In particular, ∆ is a linear order in which every element other than the last element (if it exists) has an immediate successor. Given γ ∈ Ord N let o(∆) ≥ γ be an abbreviation for the statement:
"there is some set f such that f is the (graph of) an order preserving function between (γ, ∈) and an initial segment of ∆", and let o(∆) ≥ Ord abbreviate "∀γ ∈ Ord o(∆) ≥ γ". We wish to show that the statement o(∆) ≥ Ord does not hold in N . Suppose it does. Then arguing in N , for each γ ∈ Ord there is an order-preserving map f γ which embeds (γ, ∈) onto an initial segment of ∆. Moreover, such an f γ is unique since it is a theorem of ZF that no ordinal has a nontrivial automorphism. Hence if γ ∈ γ ′ , then f γ ⊆ f γ ′ and therefore f := ∪ {f γ : γ ∈ Ord} serves as an order-preserving N -definable injection of Ord N onto an initial segment of ∆. Invoking the assumption M par N this shows that M must view N as well-founded because the map ρ N : (N, ∈ N ) → (Ord, ∈) N (where ρ is the usual rank function) is ∈ N -preserving and N -definable, and therefore M-definable since M par N . This allows us to conclude that:
(2) M views (N, ∈ N ) as a well-founded extensional structure of ordinal height at most i −1 0 (δ) ∈ Ord M . At this point we wish to invoke an appropriate form of Mostwoski's collapse theorem in order to show that (2) implies that N is a set from the point of view of M. To this end, consider KP (Kripke-Platek set theory) whose axioms consist of Extensionality, Empty Set, Pairs, Union, Π 1 -Foundation, and Σ 0 -Collection 10 . It is well-known that KP is finitely axiomatizable, and that, provably in KP, ρ (the rank function) is an ∈-homomorphism of the universe onto the class Ord of ordinals. Let KPR (Kripke-Platek set theory with ranks) be the strengthening of KP with the axiom that states that {x : ρ(x) < α} is a set for each α ∈ Ord. Theorem 2.6.1 below can be either seen as a scheme of theorems of ZF, or a single theorem of Gödel-Bernays theory of classes.
2.6.1. Theorem. If KPR holds in N , and Ord N ∼ = α ∈ Ord, then N is isomorphic to a transitive substructure of (V α , ∈).
Proof outline. Let h : α → Ord N witness the isomorphism of α and Ord N , and for γ < α let N γ := (V h(γ) , ∈) N . A routine induction on γ < α shows that there is a unique embedding j γ : N γ → (V γ , ∈) whose range is transitive. This implies that if δ < γ < α, then j δ ⊆ j γ . It is then easy to verify that j α : N → (V α , ∈) is an embedding with a transitive range, where j α := ∪ {j γ : γ < α} .
By coupling (2) with Theorem 2.6.1 we can conclude that N forms a set in M, thus contradicting (1). This concludes our verification of the failure of o(∆) ≥ Ord within N .
The failure of o(∆) ≥ Ord in N allows us to choose γ 0 ∈ Ord N such that N views γ 0 to be the first ordinal γ such that o(∆) ≥ γ is false. We claim that γ 0 is a successor ordinal of Ord N . If not, then, arguing in N , for each β ∈ γ 0 there is a unique order-preserving map f β which maps (β, ∈) onto an initial segment of ∆, and f β ⊆ f β ′ whenever β ∈ β ′ ∈ γ 0 , then f β ⊆ f β ′ . Therefore ∪ {f γ : γ ∈ γ 0 } serves as an order-preserving map between (γ 0 , ∈) and an initial segment of ∆, contradicting the choice of γ 0 . Hence γ 0 = β 0 +1 for some β 0 ∈ Ord N . This makes it clear that: (3) f β 0 is a bijection between β 0 and δ E , since if the range of f β 0 is not all of δ E , then the range ran(f β 0 ) of f β 0 is a proper initial segment of ∆, and f β 0 could be extended to an orderpreserving map f γ 0 with domain γ 0 by setting:
Thanks to (3), we now know that, as viewed by N , E is set-like when restricted to Ord M * . To verify the set-likeness of E in N it is sufficient to show that s E forms a set in N , where s E := {m ∈ M * : mEs} and
, since such ordinals δ are cofinal in Ord M * by the Reflection Theorem of ZF. Consider the N -definable structure Σ :
Since Σ is a model of KPR whose set of ordinals is isomorphic to β 0 , by Theorem 2.6.1 (applied within N ) there is an N -definable embedding of Σ onto a (transitive) subset of V N β 0
. This makes it evident that s E forms a set in N . Combined with (2) this allows us to conclude: (4) E is extensional, set-like, and well-founded within N .
At this point we invoke the Class-form of Mostowski's Collapse Theorem: 2.6.2. Theorem. [K, Theorem 5 .14] Suppose E is a well-founded, set-like class, and extensional on a class M * ; then there is a transitive class S and a 1-1 map G from M * onto S such that G is an isomorphism between (M * , E) and (S, ∈).
Theorem 2.6.2 together with (4) assure us of the existence of an N -definable S ⊆ N such that S is transitive from the point of view of N , and which has the property that there is an N -definable isomorphism i 1 , where
Finally, we verify that S = N . We first note that S must be a proper class in the sense of N , since otherwise N would be able to define the satisfaction predicate for (S, ∈) N , which coupled with the assumption that N is interpretable in M, and i := i 1 • i 0 is an M-definable isomorphism between M and (S, ∈) N , would result in M being able to define a satisfaction predicate for itself, which contradicts (an appropriate version of) Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem 11 .The transitivity of S coupled with the fact that S is a proper class in N together imply that S contains all of the ordinals of N . Therefore, if S = N, then arguing in N , let V S α be V α in the sense of (S, ∈) and let
This makes it clear, in light of the assumption that M par N , and the fact that i is an isomorphism between M and (S, ∈) N , that we have a contradiction at hand since M believes that N sees a 'new subset' of V i −1 (α 0 ) of M that is missing from M. Hence S = N and we may conclude that i is an M-definable isomorphism between M and N .
2.7. Theorem. KM is solid.
Proof. Models of KM can be represented as two-sorted structures of the form (M, A), where M |= ZF; A is a collection of subsets of M ; and (M, A) satisfies the full comprehension scheme. Suppose (M, A), (M * , A * ), and (N , B) are models of KM such that:
11 For a structure M let: Th + (M) = {( σ , a) : M |= σ(a)} , and Th − (M) = {( σ , a) : M |= ¬σ(a)} . With the above notation in mind, the version of Tarski's theorem that is invoked here says that if M is a structure that interprets Q and is endowed with a pairing function, then Th + (M) and Th − (M) are M-inseparable, i.e., there is no M-definable D such that Th
As in the proof of Theorem 2.5 we note that i 0 is naturally induced by i 0 , where:
N forms a proper class in (M, A) since if N forms a set, then so does B, and i 0 is an (M, A)-definable bijection between M ∪ A and a subset of N ∪ B.
Let E := ∈ M * . Clearly E is extensional. Furthermore, with the help of i 0 and the assumption (M, A) par (N , B) it is easy to see that E is wellfounded from the point of view of (N , B). The reader is asked to verify that an argument very similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 2.6 shows that E is also set-like in the sense of (N , B). Theorem 2.6.2 can then be invoked to obtain an (N , B)-definable isomorphism
for some (N , B)-definable transitive S ⊆ N . The verification that S = N is identical to the corresponding part in the proof of Theorem 2.6 (and in particular uses Tarski's undefinability of truth theorem). Let k 0 := i −1
Borrowing a notation from the proof of Theorem 2.5, let k 0 : (N , B) → (M, A) be the natural extension of k 0 , and k 1 : (M * , A * ) → (N , B) be the natural extension of k 1 . Note that both k 0 and k 1 are embeddings. Let k := k 0 • k 1 • i 0 ; it is clear that:
Observe that (5) and (6), together with the assumption that i 0 is an isomorphism imply that the restriction k : M → M of k to 'sets' is an automorphism of M. But since k is (M, A)-definable, k(m) = m for all m ∈ M , thanks to the veracity of the scheme of ∈-induction 12 in KM. This shows that k is the identity map and in particular it is surjective, which in turn implies that k 0 and k 1 are both surjective. This makes it clear that there is an (M, A)-definable isomorphism between (M, A) and (N , B) .
Recall that ZF was defined earlier, just before Corollary 2.5.1.
2.7.1. Corollary. The following theory T is solid:
T := ZF\{Power Set} + "∃κ (κ is strongly inaccessible, and ∀x |x| ≤ κ").
Proof. In light of Remark 2.1.1, this follows from Theorem 2.8 and the well-known bi-interpretability of T with KM + Π 1 ∞ -AC, where Π 1 ∞ -AC is the scheme of Choice. 13 2.8. Remark. An examination of the proofs in this section make it clear that for each positive integer n, the theories Z n (n-th order arithmetic) and KM n (n-th order Kelley-Morse theory of classes) are solid theories (where Z 1 := PA, and KM 1 := ZF). This observation, in turn, implies that the theory of types Z ω (with full comprehension) whose level-zero objects form a model of PA (equivalently ZF fin + TC), and the theory of types KM ω whose level-zero objects form a model of ZF are also solid theories. Thus, the list of theories whose solidity is established in this section can be described (up to bi-interpretability) as {Z n : 1 ≤ n ≤ ω} ∪ {KM n : 1 ≤ n ≤ ω} . 1 ∞ -AC is referred to as MK * , and T is referred to as SetMK * . 14 A sequential theory is a theory that has access to a definable 'β-function' for coding finite sequences of objects in the domain of discourse.
T -provability of Ind N (L T ) within a sequential theory is a sufficient condition for solidity. A simple counterexample gives a negative answer: let PA(G) be the natural extension of PA in which the induction scheme is extended to formulae in the language obtained by adding a unary predicate G to the language of arithmetic. To see that PA(G) is not solid, consider the extensions T 1 and T 2 of PA(G), where:
T 1 := PA(G) + ∀x(G(x) ↔ x = 1) and T 2 := PA(G) + ∀x(G(x) ↔ x = 2).
Clearly the deductive closures of T 1 and T 2 are distinct, and yet it is easy to see that T 1 and T 2 are bi-interpretable. This shows that PA(G) is not tight, and therefore not solid.
With the help of [ESV, Theorem 4.9 & Remark 4 .10] one can also show that the theory ZF fin is not tight, even though as shown in Corollary 2.2.1 its strengthening by TC is a solid theory. Another example of a theory that fails to be tight is ZF\{Foundation}. To see this, consider T 1 := ZF, and T 2 := ZF\{Foundation} + ∃!x(x = {x} + ∀t∃α(t ∈ V α (x)), where α ranges over ordinals, and V 0 (x) := x, V α+1 (x) := P(V α (x)), and V α (x) := β<α V β (x) for limit α.
Then T 1 and T 2 are extensions of ZF\{Foundation} with distinct deductive closures, and yet, the bi-interpretability of T 1 and T 2 can be established by well-known methods: the relevant interpretations are I and J , where I is the classic von Neumann interpretation of ZF in ZF\{Foundation}, and J is the classic Rieger-Bernays interpretation that adds a single 'Quine atom' (i.e., a set s such that s = {s}) to a model of ZF.
However, we do not know whether T ⊢ Q N + Ind N (L T ) for every solid sequential theory (for an appropriate choice of numbers N). This motivates the following question, since by a general result of Montague [Mo] the Tprovability of Q N + Ind N (L T ) implies that T is not finitely axiomatizable.
3.1. Question. Is there a consistent sequential finitely axiomatized theory that is solid?
The question below arises from reflecting on the results of Section 2 and noting that the proofs of solidity of each of the theories T established in Section 2 uses the 'full power' of T .
3.2. Question. Is there an example T of one of the theories whose solidity is established in Theorem 1.2, and some solid T 0 ⊆ T such that the deductive closure of T 0 is a proper subset of the deductive closure of T ?
